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At the ideological heart of the Communist era in Eastern Europe was the view that 
government should be a centralizer and redistributor of economic resources among all. This 
ideology was indoctrinated into the youth during the Communist era, and prior research shows 
that youth internalized it and exhibited preferences for a strong governmental role in economic 
redistribution. With such indoctrination, we would expect that the legacy of the Communist era 
would exert a strong effect on individuals’ attitudes towards the state, but for how long and how 
strong is not well known. Using the Polish Panel Survey POLPAN from 1988 to 2013, I compare 
youth opinions on State Paternalism in each five-year wave, and explore how the legacy of 
communist ideas shapes attitudes towards the welfare state. The results showed that overall 
youth in the immediate period after the fall of communism in Poland held a more positive 
evaluation of State Welfare support than youth further removed from such a time when 
compared to their elder counterparts. Furthermore, age did affect evaluation of State Welfare 
support policies—but only in certain waves and with certain age groups. The statistical analysis 
show that Polish youths’ attitudes towards socialist policies and capitalism vary by cohort. Over 
time, youth in Poland have progressively grown more distant from State Welfare support ideals. I 
discuss how the communist legacy does not appear to withstand the test of time for youth 
evaluation of such policies has grown increasingly negative as compared to their elder 















At the ideological heart of the Communist era in Eastern Europe was the view that 
government should be a centralizer and redistributor of economic resources among all. In a strong 
welfare state, the government attempts to reduce inequality by providing jobs, reducing income 
inequality, and seeking to ensure all have access to education. The benefits of such policies were 
widely touted during the Communist era, and prior research shows that youth socialized during 
the communist era internalized these values and exhibited preferences for a strong governmental 
role in economic redistribution. Consequently, we might expect that many years after Communism 
fell, the post-communist neoliberal indoctrination would produce youth who prefer a weaker role 
of the government in economic redistribution (Glass and Marquart-Pyatt 2007). While previous 
research shows that the legacy of the Communist era exerts a strong effect on citizens attitudes 
(Kunovich 2000), for how long and how strong is not well known.  
I address this puzzle by empirically examining the opinions on State Paternalism from 
youth in both the Communist era, as well as the eras following Eastern Europe’s transition to a 
market based economy and liberal democracy. Specifically, I use the Polish Panel Survey 
POLPAN from 1988 to 2013 to compare youth opinions on State Paternalism in each five-year 
wave, and explore how the legacy of communist ideas either persists or dwindles depending on 
the system youth were socialized under. Using the dependent variable of the frequency of positive 
answers related to state support, directly related to the independent variables of the years when 
these questions were asked, and specificity of the questions I can determine if the time period 
polish youth were socialized under truly impacts their opinions on State Paternalism and the 





This project contributes to prior research through an exploration of the complexity of 
political ideals, and how they are affected by time. First, by looking at their answers after both the 
fall of communism in Poland and much later on, my analysis contributes insights into how people 
react to free market systems, and how the period they were socialized in may affect their beliefs 
towards state responsibilities. I compare the answers and see the legacy of the communist period 
in Poland, whether it persisted in their belief of state supported systems, and whether the free 
market system has brought about a new wave of political ideals for Polish youth. More broadly, 
this research offers unique insights into geopolitical factors influencing youth beliefs about state 
assistance. As the youth in 1988, 1993 and 1998 would have lived under the communist regime, 
they are familiar with the extensive social resources such a system provides, whereas the youth of 
2003, 2008 and 2013 are removed from it, and therefore can give insight into how communist 
ideas—specifically regarding State Paternalism—withstand time. Overall, studying youth 
opinions on the Communist welfare system both before and after the collapse of communism will 
shed light onto the legacy political systems leave when they collapse as well as how ideals may 
vary per generation.  
 
Legacy related Support for State Paternalism Policies: Theory and Hypotheses 
As reflected in the growing support for Democratic socialism in the United States, recent 
trends in political attitudes has motivated a growing collection of research that aims to understand 
how geopolitical legacies influence attitudes towards social welfare has gained. In their analysis 
of perceptions of income inequality in post-communist Europe, Binell and Loveless (2016) argue 
that income is inversely correlated with perceptions of both income and social inequality, and 
therefore one can expect that people with higher incomes are less likely to support polices of State 





state politics during final stages of the socialist system and the initial phase of transition to 
capitalism, 1988 to 1993. She also looks at who supported welfare state policies in both periods, 
and whether personal advancement or decline in the social-stratification system had an effect on 
support for welfare state policies. She argues the following points: there should be an overall 
decline in support of welfare policies that would occur between 1988 and 1993; persons in 
vulnerable economic positions in 1993 and facing a future of economic vulnerability would be 
most supportive; and lastly individuals who were able to improve their relative positions quickly 
would be most opposed to such policies. She examined opinions related to broadening access to 
education, reducing economic inequality, and limiting unemployment in Poland. Kunovich found 
that older people are supportive of such policies, and that increase in income leads to a decrease 
in overall levels of support.  
Glass and Marquart-Pyatt (2007) analyzed changes in overall support for redistributive policies 
in Poland over time from transition of state socialism, and analyze changes in social predictors of 
support for redistribution. They look at how welfare policy changes affect attitudes toward 
redistribution and value commitments toward the role of the state, as well as how institutional 
changes in welfare affect attitudinal patterns among populations in transitional societies. The 
authors argue that there will be a strong and widespread support for redistribution specifically 
among women, the unemployed, pensioners, those with a university education and members of the 
working class. Their data includes survey questions and answers from POLPAN data in years 
1988-2003. Overall, Glass and Marquart-Pyatt found that citizens remain supportive for the most 
part, especially for those who perceive a worsening of their material situation express support for 
redistributive policies across all 4-time points. However, contrary to their hypotheses, strong 





that Poland is unique when compared to other eastern European nations, as its support for 
redistributive policies has remained somewhat strong due to the lasting legacy of state socialism. 
The sample does not control for age however, whereas factoring age into the regression can help 
one understand just how strong the state socialism legacy truly is among the newest generation to 
come of age in Polish society.  
One can argue that economic motivations are primary drivers of attitudes toward political 
redistribution of economic resources—meaning that in order to truly understand what influences 
opinions on socialist policies they must examine income and perceptions of inequality in that 
realm. Corneo and Gruner (2002), in their cross-national study of support of governmental 
reduction of income inequality, argued that individual preferences toward income redistribution 
are a mix of factors. They found that individuals who would financially benefit from a reduction 
of inequality are more likely to support it. There is a negative effect on individual relative income 
and the probability they will support such reform. Lastly, the authors found that individuals living 
in former socialist countries are more likely to support a government role in reducing inequality. 
Furthermore, Ksenia Northmore-Ball (2016) argues opinions on inequality is likewise shaped by 
process related to transition from communism in these countries; and by looking at opinions of 
youth, one can see how this transition has affected their perception of the system, and how 
increased observations of inequality may lead to varying levels of support for former socialist 
policies.  
Taken together, this literature suggests youth opinions on State Paternalism will depend on 
not only their income, education and gender, but the system under which they were socialized as 
well. As the Communist era recedes further and further into the past, the youth are less likely to 





youth are likely to support the democratic capitalist system, leading to a more negative evaluation 
on their behalf of state paternalism policies of the communist era. Building on this collection of 
scholarship, the purpose of this research is to assess the differences between youth opinions over 
time and examine whether the trends described above persist in a specific age group when 
compared to the rest of the population. Specifically, I test the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Youth in 1988 through 1998 will have a more favorable attitude toward State 
Paternalism than youth in the 2000s due to their socialization under the communist system.  
Hypothesis 2: A respondent’s age has a statistically significant impact on their evaluation 
of State Paternalism policies.  
Hypothesis 3: Respondents with higher education will evaluate State Paternalism policies 
more negatively than those with less education. 
Hypothesis 4: Respondents with higher income will evaluate State Paternalism policies 
more negatively than those with lower income.  
Data and Variables, and Methods of Analysis  
 
The Polish Panel Survey POLPAN monitors changes in structure, class and stratification 
in Poland. It has been carried out every five years since 1988, and surveys a random sample of 
about 2500 individuals a year with emphasis on surveying those who have participated before. The 
survey includes items on socio-demographics and opinions on income distribution, among others. 
POLPAN is unique because it adds younger people in each wave, and therefore can track changes 
in social structure over time. For my project, I use the POLPAN data sets from all finished waves 
(1988-2013).  
My dependent variables are constructed from the following survey questions: "The state 





state is responsible for reducing differences in incomes”, and “The state should provide jobs for 
everyone who wants to work”. These were measured on a 7 point scale, with 1 indicating 
“Definitely agree” 2 “Rather agree” 3 “Neutral” 4 “Rather Disagree” 5 “Definitely Disagree” 
98/8 “Do not Know” and 99/9 “No answer”. These questions were asked in every wave, 
allowing me to assess changes over time. For my usage, I recoded the date to have 5 represent 
“Definitely disagree” and 1 represent “Definitely disagree”, this was necessary to recode the “Do 
not know” and “no answer” variables into one category versus the two it had been broken into. I 
then created a factor variable based on correlation between each of my three recoded state 
paternalism variables based upon the original questions mentioned above. I labeled this factor 
variable “statewelfare[year]”. This then allowed me to run regressions with one variable to assess 
the effect of age, income, education and sex on a respondent’s perception of state paternalism in 
any given wave. With these questions, I can examine how youth who were socialized under 
communism perceived the responsibility of the state, and how the youth socialized under 
capitalism who are twenty years removed from such a state perceive it in the more modern times.   
For the purposes of testing the above hypotheses, the key independent variable is 
respondent’s age. I also control for a variety of other factors that previous research suggests will 
influence attitudes toward redistribution: income, education (measured in years), and gender. I also 
control for previous waves when necessary as to see if age is the most influential on youth opinions 
of socialism as predicted, and to determine how ideals about State Paternalism persist over time 
under differing systems. I can examine whether youth grow more favorable toward or against state 
paternalism compared to their elder counterparts as time progresses as well as examine any 
possible trends in Polish opinions on socialism previously unexplored.  
 






 Method(s) of Analysis:  
To test my hypotheses, I used linear regressions of State Welfare support on Age, Years of 
Education, Income and Gender.  In the 1993, 2003, 2008 and 2013 waves, I controlled for youth 
opinions of the previous waves as respondents aged 21-25 in these waves would have been 
included in the next waves as respondents aged 26-30. I did not run an interaction regression for 
1998, as no respondents were aged 21-25 in 1993 and therefore would have been removed from 
my group of interest in the 1998 wave.  
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
Results  
The results support Hypothesis 1, showing that youth in waves 1998 through 1998 do have 
a more positive evaluation of socialism than youth in waves 2003 through 2013. Though the youth 
variable was not significant in 1988, both values were positive (0.049 and 0.041), as were both for 
the youth in 1998 (0.136 and 0.010). Youth in 1993 (-0.183) had a more negative evaluation of 
socialism then their counterpart however, matching with that of youth from 2003 (-0.158 and -
0.007) and 2013 (-0.135 and -0.061). The 2008 wave presented a mixed response (-0.081 and 
0.096), with youth both negatively and positively evaluating State Welfare support policies. 
However, overall youth in the immediate period after the fall of communism in Poland held a more 
positive evaluation than their counterpart of State Welfare support than youth further removed 
from such a time.  
In partial support of Hypothesis 2, age did effect evaluation of State Welfare support 
policies—but only in certain waves and with certain age groups. In the 1988, 1993 and 2008 waves, 
age did not have an effect. However, when an interaction variable was added to the 1993 regression 





aged 26-30 in 1993 would have evaluated State Welfare support policies more negatively by 
0.241ths of a point than those aged older than thirty when controlling for all other factors. The 
control factor for 2008 youth produced no such result in the 2013 regression, and therefore 2008 
youth remained statistically insignificant in evaluating what influences opinions on State Welfare 
support policies. The Youth variable in the 1998, 2003 and 2013 waves however had a statistically 
significant impact on a respondent’s evaluation of State Welfare support policies compared to 
those over 30 even without interaction controls. In the 1998 wave, the age group 26-30 had no 
statistically significant impact, however the group aged 21-25 had a statistically significant 
positive effect (p<0.1) meaning that respondents aged 21-25 in the 1998 wave evaluated socialism 
more positively by 0.136ths of a point than those over thirty when controlling for all other factors. 
The youth aged 21-25 had no statistically significant impact in the 2003 wave, whereas the youth 
aged 26-30 had a statistically significant impact (p<0.1), so respondents aged 26-30 evaluated 
socialism more negatively by 0.16ths of a point than those over thirty when controlling for all else 
in the 2003 wave. In 2013, the youth aged 21-25 had a statistically significant impact meaning that 
respondents would have evaluated State Paternalism policies more negatively by 0.135ths of a 
point than those over thirty when controlling for all else.  
Lastly, I find support for Hypothesis 3 & 4, with results showing that a respondents’ 
education and their income both had negative effects on their perception of State Welfare support 
in all waves. Moreover, a respondents’ education (measured in years) has the strongest negative 
impact of these two hypothesis and most other variables in the regressions. While income and 
education were equally significant (p<0.01) in the 1988, 2003, and 2008 waves; in the 1993, 1998, 
and 2013 waves, education had a more  negative statistically significant impact on a respondents’ 





respondent gained, a respondent would evaluate state welfare support policies more negatively. 
Lastly, it is worth nothing that Sex was statistically significant in each wave, however further 
research would be needed to explore the link between sex and support of state paternalism policies.  
 
Discussion  
My results show that Polish youth hold an increasingly negative of state paternalism policies, 
when compared to their elder counterparts, but do not illustrate clear linkages between age and 
persistence of political system legacy. Moreover, my findings show an increasingly negative 
reaction over time, meaning that Polish youth began to perceive State Paternalism policies more 
negatively then those over thirty as time drew on, however there was not apparent explanation 
for this negative view.  
To better understand why we see mixed support and significance only in comparison to 
previous opinions (i.e. as people grew older)  is worth exploring what might be leading to the 
weak social welfare legacy among Polish youth and how that may translate into the overarching 
Communist legacy in the region. The most salient explanation for these results appears to be 
transitional difficulties seen as Poland transitioned to a market economy. To determine the effect 
of political legacies was the goal of my study, and these results appear to suggest that the legacy 
the Communist system left is a bitter one—especially with young people. The transition was by 
no means an easy one, and one “might also expect to see different values or behavior from a 
"post-transition" generation” (Pop-Eleches 2011). With such an expectation, the difference in 
opinions on state paternalism can be viewed as an indication that such a generation has arrived, 
for “as the memory of life under communism fades into the past, an individual's impression of 
the transition is likely to vary much more unevenly over time” (Pop-Eleches 2011) as did some 
opinions on State Welfare support throughout my statistical analysis. By far the most cohesive 





problems experienced explain why Polish youth may hold a negative evaluation versus their 
elder counterparts. In order to understand why youth opinions may be so negative as a result of 
the transition from Communism to capitalism, it is important to account for the difficulty in the 
transition as well as the winners and losers of the transition process.  
 The transitional period from a command economy to a market economy in Poland gave 
way to many problems, and the country quickly faced unprecedented rates of inflation and 
unemployment. In the first year alone, prices grew “by 39.5% in August, 34.4% in September, 
and 54.8% October [of 1989]” (Oyrzanowski 1993) and later, prices grew by“78.6% in January 
and 23.9% in February of 1990. (Oyrzanowski 1993). Poles who had seen steady prices over the 
years were suddenly experiencing how demand affects price, and the demand for resources drove 
the prices to nearly unaffordable levels. This rise in prices was coupled with a drop in income 
“between 3% and 7% in the first half” (Oyrzanowski 1993) as well as a rise in unemployment. 
From June to December of 1990, unemployment rose from 3.2% to 6.3% (Oyrzanowski 1993), 
nearly doubling in six months. This rise continued with unemployment reaching a peak of 13.2% 
of the population in July of 1992. (Oyrzanowski 1993). These statistics indicate a rough 
transition from the get go, as Poland experienced “recession, hyperinflation, economic 
destabilization, spiraling unemployment and growing poverty” (Horvat 2011) early on. In other 
words, Poland suffered an economic shock, and by the early ‘90s, “unemployment benefits 
amount to 36% of the average wage minus income tax” (Oyrzanowski 1993/51). Over a quarter 
of the average wage was being provided by the state, and in turn “Forty-three percent of wage 
earners slid below the poverty line in the first half of 1992” (Hunter 2006). Polish society as it 
had existed before was essentially in shambles, as the young democracy struggled to balance 





certain groups more, Poland suffered as a whole during the transition, with a GDP only matching 
up to 39% of Western Europe in 1995 (Berend 2015). Poland’s transition to a market economy 
was messy, and citizens experienced not only a social shock as systems began to be gutted, but 
also a harsh economic shock as well with “as much as 20-30 percent of the population falling 
into poverty (Berend 2015)”. The Polish economic system—and population—suffered during the 
transition, and for people who were either just coming of age or aging out of the workforce, they 
would be forced into two categories in turn affecting their perception of the communist system 
for years to come.  
 These two categories would come to be known as the “winners” and the “losers” of the 
Polish economic transition. The people coming of age during the transition were in a unique 
position, as “young people in the 1990s had to negotiate a new environment, as unfamiliar to the 
traditional guides of parents and teachers as to the youths themselves” (Burrell 2011). The 
system their parents had grown up in was gone, and the new and emerging system presented 
many difficulties already. The focus on youth experience is especially pertinent, as younger 
generations as categorized as winners in the aforementioned model. This winners and losers 
model examines how “those who became winners in the process of transformation were, at its 
start in the late 1980s, in the forefront of those who liked socialism. However, when their success 
strengthened in the new system, they forgot about the advantages stemming from the old regime” 
(Slomczynski 2002). Winners were “managers, experts, owners, and supervisors” Słomczyński 
2002), they were ““well-educated people, represented younger generations, came from bigger 
cities and legitimized rather short working experience in state-owned companies” (Szczepański 





in Poland” (Szczepański 2010). These people would be unlikely to favor the communist system 
because the market system had improved their standard of living.  
In a study done by Słomczyński et al., participants were asked “Do you think that the 
socialist system brought to the majority of people in Poland: (1) gains only, (2) more gains than 
losses, (3) as many gains as losses, (4) more losses than gains, or (5) losses only?” (Słomczyński 
2002). Those in the category of winner—especially experts and managers—showed a “regular 
and significant decrease in positive assessments of socialism. In 1988, they were at the top of the 
support hierarchy for socialism, while, in 1998, they landed at the very bottom” (Słomczyński 
2002). These winners would have seen the system start to favor them, and therefore a negative 
assessment of the precious way only made sense. This negative feeling has persisted and “by 
2007 Eastern Europeans agreed on average that their situation has improved… but the key 
finding is that the young have come to view their future economic prospects and the experience 
of the market place much more positively than early in the transition, while this was not apparent 
among older respondents” (Horvat  2011).  Younger generations are growing increasingly 
negative towards the communist system, and my research highlights these results with my 
increasingly negative youth opinions. This notion of young people being “winners” would 
explain the occurrence of positive opinions in the relatively earlier transitional years, as well as 
why opinions began to shift even for those older young adults as the transition entered the late 
90s and early 2000s.  
There were also “those who became losers in the transformation [and later] realized the 
advantages of socialism” (Słomczyński 2002)—or those who would hold a more positive 
evaluation of state paternalism policies. The “losers” mainly consisted in “citizens with poorer 





working experience in state-owned companies. Individuals supporting this attitude were 
characterized by the fear of change and withdrawal attitude” (Szczepański 2010). This negative 
perception if the market system stemmed from the difficult transition, particularly “the 
increasing cost of living and low wages” (Szczepański 2010) as well as the effect of “state 
subsidies [that were] cut and price controls [that were] lifted” (Horvat 2011). At the same time, 
“unregulated markets started to emerge… and Older age groups were often negatively and 
disproportionately affected” (Horvat 2011). With rising income inequality and prices, older 
generations who relied mainly on pensions found themselves at or below the poverty line very 
early in the transition. As a result, these people suffered the most during the transition, as  “the 
fixed incomes of pensioners would make managing in the face of economic reform progressively 
more difficult as social welfare provisions continue to be cut” (Horvat 2011). They system they 
had grown used to with the ability to protect them from economic crisis was swept under from 
under them, and older generations faced inflation with uncertainty and longing for assistance. 
Furthermore, while young Poles now had unlimited opportunity, “older Eastern Europeans 
[experience] would have been made worse through a likely devaluation of certain resources and 
statuses attained under communism” (Horvat 2011). Whereas a market system presented 
limitless opportunity in terms of income and profession for young people just coming of age, 
those who had worked their whole life one way or another were not guaranteed a stable future in 
the same profession. Their ability to sustain had been threatened in a way it had not been under 
communism, and their opinions reflect their uncertainty of the new market system. This would 
be the group that held a more positive evaluation of socialism in each wave, as “individuals 
constituting [the] category of losers were not prepared participation in an emerging market 





against them, making it harder for them to see opportunity among the potential financial ruin 
many faced.  
While young people would have had the chance to make their own way in the new 
market system, older people were more likely to be on a fixed income and share “a common 
belief in safety rooted in a state owner, and fear of unpredictable future with private companies 
and modernity which they offer” (Oyrzanowski 1993). Thus the two generations became 
increasingly polarized, as the transition was worse for elder generations for younger, and youth 
expectations and experiences of positivity with the new market would only lead to further 
dissatisfaction for “older people would have borne the costs of economic reform 
disproportionately” (Horvat 2011). Therefore the challenging transition created a generational 
gap, one where older people “whose standard of living deteriorated in the course of transition 
tend to hold relatively more skeptical views of democracy and the market (Horvat 2011). 
Whereas the Communist system was less free, the current system held inflation and fear of 
unemployment, leaving older generations skeptical of its true possibility and favorable towards 
the old ways. Under this framework, it is clear the younger generations of Poles would hold a 
more positive evaluation of the Capitalist market system and a more negative perception of a 
system that caps their earnings, directly juxtaposed to the older generation who saw tremendous 
difficulty in the early market system years. Through the lens of transitional difficulty, it appears 
my results of increasingly negative opinions on State Paternalism among Polish youth may be a 
result of the “winners” and “losers” dynamic of the systemic shift.  
This links directly to my own research, specifically as my youth opinions grew more 
negative over time. My youth opinions initially started as positive, but as soon as 1993 grew 





Furthermore, since I separated youth to compare to their older counterparts, it is clear their 
opinion is more negative than that of said elder counterparts. The elder generation therefore 
appears to fit the “loser” category, as one can see the youth opinions on State Paternalism are 
more negative. This market transition took years, and would explore why anomalies such as 
1998, for the economy had just begun to recover from the intitial transition phase but was not 
quite a full market system yet. To elaborate, when controlling for the 1998 interaction term, one 
can see that the 2003 wave grew increasingly negative, meaning that as the transition neared 
completion youth began to turn against state paternalism policies. Negativity quickly reappeared 
in 2003 and onward, when youth (especially those 21-25) would have been coming of age in full 
market economy with seemingly limitless opportunity. For those positive evaluations from the 
26-30 group in 2008, one can factor in how these groups would have come of age during the 
tough transition and were then living through another economic crisis, and therefore may hold a 
positive evaluation as they would have seen the inflation or possibly faced unemployment. 
Though age was not significant in every wave, it quickly became so when controlling for 
previous opinion, showing that as youth began to experience the market economy, their 
perception of state paternalism policies grew more negative over time—even a 5-year period. It 
appears age and opinion on state paternalism policies are linked, and the influence age has is 
connected to the experience youth had growing up in a transitional economy as the “winners” in 
the system. As time wore on, youth would evaluate state welfare support more negatively than 








Youth in Poland have progressively grown more distant from State Welfare support 
ideals then their older counterparts and the communist legacy does not appear to have withstood 
the test of time. Youth evaluations of such policies have grown increasingly negative when 
compared to those over thirty in each wave as the communist era fades into memory. Though 
fading is bound to happen in any system as previous ideals die with older regenerations, it is 
apparent in this specific case, increasingly negative perception can be viewed as a consequence 
of the difficult transition, and the idea that youth found themselves as winners when during 
economic hardship. Based on the data collected and a comparisons of previous studies and 
accounts, my findings that there are increasingly negative youth views of state paternalism in 
comparison to their elder counterpart illustrate not only a changing of youth opinions over time, 
but also a widening generation gap between those who suffered in the transition from a 
command economy and those who did not. The legacy of the communist system in Poland has 
become polarized, and my study examines how age may factor into a negative or positive 
perception of state paternalism policies.  One important direction for future research is to 
compare the youth of former communist nations and the youth of non-communist nations, to test 
how ideals verses implementation factor into opinions on political systems. It is also important 
also further examine the effects of education and income to assess how these factors influence 
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Minimum Maximum N 
Age      
1988 (Ages 21-25) 0.070  0.000 1.000 5618.000 
1988 (Ages 26-30) 0.120 0.330 0.000 1.000 5618.000 
1993 (Ages 26-30) 0.080 0.270 0.000 1.000 2259.000 
1998 (Ages 21-25) 0.100 0.290 0.000 1.000 2135.000 
1998 (Ages 26-30) 0.080 0.270 0.000 1.000 2135.000 
2003 (Ages 21-25) 0.130 0.340 0.000 1.000 1699.000 
2003 (Ages 26-30) 0.070 0.260 0.000 1.000 1699.000 
2008 (Ages 21-25) 0.320 0.470 0.000 1.000 1805.000 
2008 (Ages 26-30) 0.070 0.260 0.000 1.000 1805.000 
2013 (Ages 21-25) 0.190 0.390 0.000 1.000 2581.000 
2013 (Ages 26-30) 0.130 0.340 0.000 1.000 2581.000 
Education      
1988 (In years) 10.270 2.860 5.000 17.000 5618.000 
1993 (In years) 10.740 3.100 5.000 17.000 2259.000 
1998 (In years) 10.920 3.020 5.000 17.000 2063.000 
2003 (In years) 11.510 3.060 5.000 21.000 1696.000 
2008 (In years) 11.920 3.490 4.000 20.000 1805.000 
2013 (In years) 12.490 3.070 6.000 20.000 2184.000 
Income      
1988 145.030 91.060 14.290 2666.670 5333.000 
1993 1688.290 3332.860 0.000 125000.000 2055.000 
1998 605.650 823.240 0.000 20000.000 1867.000 
2003 785.780 706.030 0.000 13000.000 1644.000 
2008 1135.430 908.130 100.000 12100.000 1460.000 
2013 1548.200 1703.530 0.000 50000.000 2021.000 
State Welfare Factor     
1988 0.000 1.000 -4.440 1.090 1901.000 
1993 0.000 1.000 -3.980 1.150 1158.000 
1998 0.000 1.000 -4.420 1.240 2135.000 
2003 0.000 1.000 -4.160 1.080 1699.000 
2008 0.000 1.000 -4.940 1.210 1805.000 
2013 -4.970 1.000 -4.970 1.140 2581.000 
      
Sex 0.470 0.500 0.000 1.000 7304.000 






Table 2: Multi-Variate Regressions          
              M1   M2        M3    M4 M5 M6  M7   M8      M9    
          
Ages 21-25 (1988)        0.049                        
 (0.084)                        
Ages 26-30 (1988) 0.041                        
   (0.069)                        
Income per Capita (88)   -0.001***                        
   (0.000)                        
Education in years (88) -0.050***                        
 (0.010)                        
Sex (1=Male) -0.117** -0.171*** -0.132*** -0.189*** -0.201*** -0.245*** -0.128* -0.119*** -0.156***   
 (0.047) (0.057) (0.044) (0.046) (0.050) (0.047) (0.066) (0.047) (0.062)    
Ages 26-30 (1993)  -0.183     -0.241*                  
  (0.109)     (0.135)                  
Income per Capita (93) -0.000    -0.000                   
  (0.000)     (0.000)                  
Education in years(93) -0.119***    -0.107***                  
  (0.011)     (0.012)                  
Ages 21-25 (1998)   0.136*                      
   (0.076)                      
Ages 26-30 (1998)   0.010                      
   (0.076)                      
Income per Capita(98)  -0.000**                       
   (0.000)                      
Education in years(98)  -0.090***                      
   (0.009)                      
Ages 21-25 (2003)    -0.007    0.000                
    (0.071)    (0.000)               
Ages 26-30 (2003)    -0.158*    -0.196**                
    (0.088)    (0.089)                
Income per Capita(03)   -0.000***    -0.000***                  
    (0.000)    (0.000)                
Education in years(03)   -0.069***    -0.049***                  
    (0.009)    (0.009)                
Ages 21-25 (2008)     -0.081                    
     (0.058)                    
Ages 26-30 (2008)     0.096                    





                    
 
Table 2 (cont.)             M1  M2 M3                    M4                 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9    
Income per Capita(08)    -0.000***                     
     (0.000)                    
Education in years(08)    -0.056***                     
     (0.008)                    
Ages 21-25 (2013)      -0.135**                   
      (0.065)                   
Ages 26-30 (2013)      -0.061   -0.113    
      (0.072)   (0.069)    
Income per Capita (13)     -0.000***   -0.000*** 
      (0.000)   (0.000)    
Education in years(13)     -0.087***   -0.050***  
      (0.009)   (0.010)    
Interaction (1988)       -0.250*                  
       (0.134)                  
State welfare support(88)      0.274***                   
       (0.037)                  
Interaction (1998)        -0.001                
        (0.111)                
State welfare support (98)       0.268***                  
        (0.031)                
Interaction (2008)         0.079    
         (0.081)    
State welfare support (08)        0.389*** 
         (0.036)    
Constant 0.695 1.424 1.137 1.103 1.089 1.342 1.279 0.778 0.860 
 (0.103) (0.110) (0.090) (0.093) (0.086) (0.105) (0.128) (0.100) (0.134)        
    
r2                 0.041          0.152           0.105           0.117           0.138           0.118           0.240           0.184           0.299    
df_m           5.000           4.000           5.000           5.000           5.000           5.000           6.000           6.000           6.000 
N                1785.000      1044.000     1809.000    1642.000      1460.000     1701.000     699.000      1426.000      866.000    
*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
                           










Appendix: Annotated Syntax That Corresponds with the Tables 
Table 3: Variables as coded in STATA 
   
Name of variable 
(year of POLPAN 
wave in parentheses) 
Original 
variable as 
listed in the 
data set 
Coding of the 
variable as used 
in this paper 






Factor Variable of 
opinions on State 
Welfare Support 





































Youth aged 21-25 in 
1988 
(youth88_21_25) 
age1988 Dummy variable 
consisting of 
respondents aged 
21-25 in the 1988 
wave (1=21/25; 
0=else) 
Youth aged 26-30 in 
1988 
(youth88_26_30) 
age1998 Dummy variable 
consisting of 
respondents aged 
26-30 in the 1988 
wave (1=26/30; 
0=else) 
Youth aged 26-30 in 
1993* 
(youth93_26_30) 
age1993 Dummy variable 
consisting of 
respondents aged 
26-30 in the 1993 
wave (1=26/30; 
0=else) 
Youth aged 21-25 in 
the 1998 wave 
(youth98_21_25) 
age1998 Dummy variable 
consisting of 
respondents aged 







Youth aged 26-30 in 
the 1998 wave 
(youth98_26_30) 
age1998 Dummy variable 
consisting of 
respondents aged 
26-30 in the 1998 
wave (1=26/30; 
0=else) 
Youth aged 21-25 in 
the 2003 wave 
(youth03_21_25) 
age2003 Dummy variable 
consisting of 
respondents aged 
21-25 in the 2003 
wave (1=21/25; 
0=else) 
Youth aged 26-30 in 
the 2003 wave 
(youth03_26_30) 
age2003 Dummy variable 
consisting of 
respondents aged 
26-30 in the 2003 
wave (1=26/30; 
0=else) 
Youth aged 21-25 in 
the 2008 wave 
(youth08_21_25) 
age2008 Dummy variable 
consisting of 
respondents aged 
21-25 in the 2008 
wave (1=21/25; 
0=else) 
Youth aged 26-30 in 
the 2008 wave 
(youth08_26_30) 
age2008 Dummy variable 
consisting of 
respondents aged 
26-30 in the 2008 
wave (1=26/30; 
0=else) 
Youth aged 21-25 in 
the 2013 wave 
(youth13_21_25) 
age2013 Dummy variable 
consisting of 
respondents aged 
21-25 in the 2013 
wave (1=21/25; 
0=else) 
Youth aged 26-30 in 
the 2013 wave 
(youth13_26_30) 
age2013 Dummy variable 
consisting of 
respondents aged 
26-30 in the 2013 
wave (1=26/30; 
0=else) 
Average Income per 











Average Income per 















Average Income per 











Average Income per 













Average Income per 












Average income per 












R’s education in years 
in the 1988 wave 
(eduyrs88) 
eduyrs88 Metric Variable 
measuring a 
Respondent's 
education in years 
ranging from 5-17 
in 1988 
R’s education in years 
in the 1993 wave 
(eduyrs93) 
eduyrs93 Metric Variable 
measuring a 
Respondent's 
education in years 
ranging from 5-17 
in 1993 
R’s education in years 
in the 1998 wave 
(eduyrs98) 
 
eduyrs98 Metric Variable 
measuring a 
Respondent's 
education in years 
ranging from 5-17 
in 1998 
R’s education in years 
in the 2003 wave 
(eduyrs03) 
 
eduyrs03 Metric Variable 
measuring a 
Respondent's 
education in years 






R’s education in years 
in the 2008 wave 
(eduyrs08) 
 
eduyrs08 Metric Variable 
measuring a 
Respondent's 
education in years 
ranging from 4-20 
in 2008 
R’s education in years 
in the 2013 wave 
(eduyrs13) 
 
eduyrs13 Metric Variable 
measuring a 
Respondent's 
education in years 
ranging from 6-20 
in 2013 
Respondents gender  
(sex) 




Table 4. Factor Analysis of State Welfare 
 Distribution Factor Loading 
Name of variable 
(year of POLPAN 
wave in 
parentheses) 




Opinion on State 
aid to children (‘88) 
 4.2  1.0 
 
0.752 




1.2  0.716 
Opinions on State 





Opinion on State 
aid to children (‘93) 
 4.3 0.9  
 0.695 
Opinion on state  
Inequality (‘93) 




Opinions on State 
provided jobs (‘93) 
4.3 1.0 0.795 
1998 1998c 
Opinion on State 
aid to children (‘98) 
4.5 0.7  0.653 
Opinion on state  
Inequality (‘98) 
3.5 1.2  0.715 
Opinions on State 
provided jobs (‘98) 
 4.2 1.1 0.793 
2003 2003d 
Opinion on State 
aid to children (‘03) 
4.6 0.6 0.654 
Opinion on state  
Inequality (‘03) 
3.7 1.2 0.728 
Opinions on State 
provided jobs (‘03) 






Opinion on State 
aid to children (‘08) 
4.5 0.6 0.669 
 
Opinion on state  
Inequality (‘08) 
3.8 1.1  0.758 
 
Opinions on State 
provided jobs (‘08) 
4.2 0.1  0.792 
2013 2013f 
Opinion on State 
aid to children (‘13) 
4.5 0.7 0.658 
Opinion on state  
Inequality (‘13) 
3.7  1.2 0.688 
Opinions on State 
provided jobs (‘13) 
4.3 0.1  0.761 
A: Eigenvalue= 1.61; Proportion of expected variance= 0.54 
B: Eigenvalue= 1.70; Proportion of expected variance= 0.57 
C: Eigenvalue= 1.57; Proportion of expected variance= 0.52 
D: Eigenvalue= 1.56; Proportion of expected variance= 0.52 
E: Eigenvalue=  1.65; Proportion of expected variance=  0.55 
F: Eigenvalue=  1.48; Proportion of expected variance=  0.50
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